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assumption that government should have a bigger role in directing philanthropies and their assets because the 
money held by charities is “public money.” Now, two eminent students of philanthropy have completed a 
comprehensive analysis of the public-money claim, How Public Is Private Philanthropy: Separating Myth 
from Reality (Philanthropy Roundtable, June 2009 – available online at 
www.philanthropyroundtable.org). The authors are EVELYN BRODY, 
professor at the Chicago-Kent College of Law, and JOHN TYLER, secretary 
and general counsel of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. Brody and 
Tyler have concluded, on the basis of the numerous applicable legal 
precedents, that the public-money assertion is largely myth. 
 
On June 19, 2009, the Bradley Center for Philanthropy and Civic Renewal 
hosted a panel discussion with TYLER as well as RALPH SMITH of the 
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PROGRAM AND PANEL 
 
12:00 p.m.     Welcome by Hudson Institute’s WILLIAM SCHAMBRA 
12:10             Panel discussion 
                      JOHN TYLER, Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation 
                      RALPH SMITH, Annie E. Casey Foundation 
                      RAY MADOFF, Boston College School of Law 
                      GLENN LAMMI, Washington Legal Foundation 
1:10               Question-and-answer session 
2:00               Adjournment 
 
FURTHER INFORMATION 
This transcript was prepared from an audio recording and edited by Krista Shaffer. To request further information 
on this event or the Bradley Center, please visit our web site at http://pcr.hudson.org, contact Hudson Institute at 
(202) 974-2424, or send an e-mail to Krista Shaffer at Krista@hudson.org. 
 
H U D S O N  I N S T I T U T E  
 
  1015 15th Street, N.W.           202.974.2400 
  Suite 600    202.974.2410 Fax 
  Washington, DC 20005                      http://pcr.hudson.org 
 2
Panel Biographies 
 
Glenn G. Lammi is chief counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation’s Legal Studies 
Division. He began at the foundation in 1992 as counsel. As chief counsel, Lammi 
coordinates legal policy advocacy and educational programs for the foundation. Lammi also 
administers Washington Legal Foundation’s nationwide networking efforts to recruit pro 
bono authors and speakers, and serves as the legal staff’s main liaison with the foundation’s 
public relations and marketing departments. He has authored numerous articles and analyses 
on a wide range of legal issues published by the foundation, as well as by national and local 
newspapers and journals, such as The New York Times, the Washington Post, USA Today and 
California Lawyer. Lammi also frequently presents the foundation’s position to the broadcast 
media, appearing on CNN, C-SPAN, ABC’s World News Tonight, Court TV, and other 
outlets. 
 
Ray Madoff is a professor at Boston College Law School where she teaches trusts and 
estates, estate and gift, tax, estate planning, and a seminar on immortality and the law. She is 
the lead author of Practical Guide to Estate Planning (CCH), and has written in a wide 
variety of areas involving property and death. Her current project is a book exploring the 
legal treatment of the dead, called Immortality and the Law: The Rising Power of the 
American Dead (Yale University Press). Prior to teaching, she was a practicing attorney in 
New York and Boston. Professor Madoff is a member of the American Law Institute, an 
academic fellow of the American College of Trusts and Estates Counsel and past chair of the 
Trusts and Estates Section of the American Association of Law Schools. She also serves on 
the board of directors of the ACTEC Foundation. 
 
Ralph Smith is executive vice president of the Annie E. Casey Foundation. Previously, as 
the foundation’s senior vice president and director of planning and development, he helped 
design the foundation’s comprehensive effort to help communities improve outcomes for 
children by strengthening families and neighborhoods. Smith serves on the boards of the 
Council on Foundations, the Foundation Center, Wachovia Regional Foundation, the 
Annenberg Institute for School Reform, and Venture Philanthropy Partners. A legal scholar 
and attorney, he was a member of the law faculty at the University of Pennsylvania and 
authored briefs in landmark cases before the United States Supreme Court and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals. He served in senior leadership positions for the Philadelphia school district and 
as senior advisor to the mayor. He is the founding director for the National Center on Fathers 
and Families and the Philadelphia Children’s Network. Smith is an active participant in 
various councils and networks working to improve national and international philanthropy. 
 
John E. Tyler III is general counsel, secretary, and chief ethics officer for the Ewing Marion 
Kauffman Foundation. Tyler previously practiced law with one of Kansas City’s largest law 
firms, focusing on commercial litigation, personal injury litigation, and employment law. 
Tyler serves and has served as a director and officer of several national and local nonprofit 
organizations, including for the Alliance for Charitable Reform and on the advisory board for 
NYU Law School’s National Center for Philanthropy and the Law and Independent Sector’s 
advisory group on Nonprofit Effectiveness. Tyler also is a frequent speaker and author on 
such broad ranging topics as nonprofit governance, intellectual property, and advancing 
university innovation.  
 
 3
Proceedings 
 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: I’m Bill Schambra, director of the Bradley Center for Philanthropy 
and Civic Renewal at Hudson Institute. Krista Shaffer and I welcome you to today’s panel 
discussion entitled, “How Public Is Private Philanthropy?” We’re particularly honored that 
the Philanthropy Roundtable chose this venue for the world premiere of the monograph our 
panel will discuss shortly. 1 
 
And we’re pleased to have with us in the audience one of its co-authors, Evelyn Brody of the 
Chicago Kent College of Law, as well as collaborating author Suzanne Garment, who will be 
a visiting fellow at Indiana University’s Center on Philanthropy.  
 
Our thanks again to the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy (NCRP) for joining 
us last month (May 28, 2009) for a lively and stimulating discussion of its latest major 
publication, the report Criteria for Philanthropy at Its Best: Benchmarks to Assess and 
Enhance Grantmaker Impact. The full transcript of that discussion was just posted on our 
website, and might be considered a worthy companion to today’s conversation.2 
 
It’s a good sign for philanthropy, I think, that both the Philanthropy Roundtable and NCRP 
are willing to go beyond the typical one-sided promotional events for their publications, and 
are prepared instead to encourage and engage directly in a genuine discussion about their 
product. Would that more foundations and nonprofits were courageous and imaginative 
enough to do so! The Bradley Center stands prepared to make that happen for any group so 
inclined. 
 
On January 20, 1910, almost a century ago, the United States House of Representatives 
passed – by a vote of 152 to 65 – a bill awarding a federal charter to the foundation planned 
by fabulously wealthy millionaire John D. Rockefeller. By the time the bill was introduced to 
the House by Rockefeller’s allies, it had already left little doubt that this private philanthropy 
was in fact going to be pretty public: 
 
The bill provided that the foundation board could elect its own members, but election would 
not become effective until notice of same had been sent to each of the following: the 
president of the United States, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the president of the 
Senate, the speaker of the House, and the presidents of six universities – Harvard, Yale, 
Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and the University of Chicago. They, in turn, would have sixty 
days to approve or disapprove of each new foundation board member. 
 
Nonetheless, the House of Representatives, noting in the bill that a federal charter was being 
considered only “because the gift is to the people of the United States, and is to be controlled 
by them rather than in the interest of any one section,” added even more strictures. 
Amendments specified that the foundation was to proceed strictly by “philanthropic means.” 
Perpetuity was ruled out. The total endowment was limited. All income was to be spent each 
                                                 
1 How Public Is Private Philanthropy? Separating Myth from Reality (Philanthropy Roundtable, June 2009). 
The monograph is available free online at 
http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/files/Public_Private%20Monograph_high%20res_Final.pdf  
2 The transcript can be found on the Bradley Center’s web page on Hudson Institute’s web site, at 
http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=hudson_upcoming_events&id=665  
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year. The number of board members was increased from five members to nine. And to top it 
all off, Congress reserved to itself “complete power to impose such limitations upon the 
objects of the corporation as the public interest may demand.” 
 
As it turns out, this bill went to the Senate but never emerged from committee, leaving Mr. 
Rockefeller to seek a charter for his new foundation from his home state, New York – a 
charter that included none of the limitations demanded by Congress. Had the original federal 
charter been awarded to Rockefeller, and had that become the pattern for all major American 
foundations, there wouldn’t have been much to discuss here today – although the 
involvement of so many university presidents would have raised all sorts of other interesting 
questions, I’m sure. 
 
But happily for the exempt organizations committee of the American Bar Association – and 
those of us who enjoy lively debate – the demise of the Rockefeller federal charter bill left us 
with plenty of room to discuss the question before us, how public is private philanthropy? 
And to help us tackle that question, we have a distinguished panel of experts on the issue, all 
with backgrounds in both philanthropy and the law. 
 
We’ll hear first this morning from another co-author of the document, John Tyler III, who is 
general counsel and secretary for the Ewing Marion Kauffmann Foundation in Kansas City. 
Next will be Glenn Lammi, chief counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation’s Legal 
Studies Division. Then, in her second appearance on a Bradley Center panel, Ray Madoff, 
professor at Boston College Law School, where she’s working on a book entitled– I couldn’t 
resist mentioning this title – Immortality and the Law: The Rising Power of the American 
Dead.  
 
(Laughter.)  
 
It’s on its way to the publishers, and we’ll have her back to talk about that! Finally, also 
returning for a second panel visit is Ralph Smith, executive vice president of the Annie E. 
Casey Foundation in Baltimore and board chair this year at the Council on Foundations.  
 
So, John, would you kick off our discussion? 
 
JOHN TYLER: Thank you, Bill (Schambra), and also thank you very much to Hudson 
Institute for your willingness to host this event and for allowing us to premiere the 
monograph in such a wonderful way. I want to give a special thank you to Bill (Schambra) 
for his work in putting such a great panel together, and also thank the panelists for helping 
Professor Brody and me achieve one of our goals – and one of the Philanthropy Roundtable’s 
goals – for the piece as well, which is to engage and ignite a conversation around the meaning 
and implications of “public money.” I’m very grateful to the panelists for helping us do that 
here today. Also, I very much want to thank the Philanthropy Roundtable and the Searle 
Freedom Trust for giving Evelyn (Brody), Susie (Garment), and me the opportunity to work 
on this monograph, for their support, and for publishing it.  
 
The tension between “government” and “public,” and the influence of “government” and 
“public” on the assets of foundations and charitable organizations goes back about two 
centuries; although not so much with the foundations’ side of it. In 1819 the US Supreme 
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Court was faced with a case that is now famously called the Dartmouth case.3 The case had to 
do with the ability of the state legislature to dictate to Dartmouth College that it needed to 
expand its board and become a university as opposed to a college. The debate goes back at 
least that far. 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the concept of “public money” began to receive greater 
awareness and became something of a term of art, but an ill-defined term of art. Carnegie 
Corporation president Alan Pifer spoke of “public money,” and then went on to reject its 
implications as suggesting that the term would allow greater government control of 
foundations, charities, and their assets.4 Merrimon Cuninggim, who was president of the 
Danforth Foundation, also acknowledged the term “public money” and the “publicness” of 
the assets of these enterprises. He added, though, that while it’s public money, it’s private 
decision making. And he clarified that latter point as an “immensely important distinction” – 
that the decisions are private; the decisions about the assets are beyond the “hands of the 
general public or of Government.”5 
 
More recently, the term “public money” seems to have taken on increasing significance as a 
term to support increased government and public control over foundation and other charity 
assets, governance, decision making, analysis of effectiveness, and other things. But a lot of 
those conversations have missed the nuanced part of Merrimon Cuninggim’s analysis; there 
is a duality of public money but private decision making. The emphasis more recently seems 
to be on the “public money” part, on the nature of the assets as public money.  
 
Evelyn (Brody) and I had an opportunity, because of the Philanthropy Roundtable, to look 
into what “public money” means in a legal, literal sense. That’s what we’ve tried to do, and 
that is what we hope the monograph succeeds in doing – in looking at the term “public 
money” in its legal, literal framework. What does it mean? What should it mean? What are 
the implications that arise from or come out of the application of the literal term? As we 
looked at where the term comes from, what it is grounded in, we found that there are three 
primary arguments.  
 
The first is that foundations and charities are charged with serving public purposes. The 
second argument is that because foundations and other charities are chartered by the state, 
that state charter or their capacity in a number of factors could cause foundations and other 
charities generally to be considered “state actors,” or subject to right-to-know laws as are 
government agencies. The third argument, which is the most commonly made argument and 
the one that comes most immediately to mind for most people, is the tax-favored treatment by 
way of the federal tax exemption that organizations get and the charitable contribution 
deduction that donors receive.6 
 
After undertaking this analysis, what Professor Brody and I concluded is that these assertions 
do not legally justify the lost autonomy, the lost independence, and the loss of privacy that 
foundations and other charities enjoy and should enjoy as entities that are the fulcrum 
between the government sector and the business sector as those sectors interrelate in our 
political systems, our civic and social systems, and our economic systems.  
                                                 
3 A discussion of this case can be found on pages 28-30 and 64 in How Public Is Private Philanthropy? 
4 See How Public Is Private Philanthropy? p. 17. 
5 Ibid. 
6 These three arguments are discussed in chapters I, II, and III, respectively, of How Public Is Private 
Philanthropy? 
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At the risk of taking an eighty-page document and presenting it in twelve to fifteen minutes – 
obviously this is a high-level summary presentation; the document stands for itself and has a 
lot more detail – let me look at each of the three arguments that are generally used to support 
the public-money designation.  
 
The first, as I mentioned, is that foundations and other charities are charged with serving 
public purposes – therefore, their assets are public money, and the entities themselves are 
public organizations. As the Supreme Court made clear in the Dartmouth case, “public 
purposes” does not mean “government purposes.” There is a broader view of what public 
purposes means than just government purposes. As you look at the sector itself, there are 
many exempt organizations that serve purposes that government can’t serve. Churches and 
other religious organizations and associations are among them. There are exempt 
organizations that serve purposes that are not supported by the government and would not be 
supported by the government, particularly if you look at the changing government and 
changing controls in government. Therefore, “public purposes” does not mean government 
purposes.  
 
It also does not mean that all citizens must benefit from the organization’s assets or its 
operations. When you look at the different types of exempt organizations out there, there is 
no mandate that everyone in a particular geographic area or a particular community benefit 
from the operations or assets of a foundation or charity. In addition, these organizations are 
founded by donors, by founders, by creators, and they continue to be managed and overseen 
by boards of private individuals making private decisions about what subset of the public is 
to be served and what subset of the public purpose is to be served.  
 
It is clear, though, that “public purposes” does mean not private purposes. These 
organizations still can’t serve purely private purposes.  
 
The next argument that is frequently made is that the state chartering of foundations and other 
charities renders them public. The Supreme Court in the 1819 Dartmouth case made it 
absolutely clear that is not the case. The act of incorporating, the act of chartering an entity to 
exist, does not in and of itself render the organization public.  
 
There are times when the state legislature or other legislative body will in fact specifically 
and specially charter organizations. The issue with those specific charters is different than 
what we are talking about – the broad, general charter filing under general charter rules. Look 
at for-profit businesses that charter in states, and corporations that incorporate in states; the 
fact of their chartering does not render them public. They are not public agencies. They are 
not public bodies. Richard Posner in a Seventh Circuit case as recently as 2004 addressed the 
nature of that issue.  
 
So these issues don’t just go back almost two hundred years; they are current, and that they 
continue to be resolved in favor of chartering does not equate with “public.”  
 
Related to that argument about chartering, folks have argued in the past – and these 
arguments do go back a long way – that it’s not just chartering, but there are other factors that 
could render an otherwise private organization to be a state actor subject to government 
control, subject to governmental and constitutional restrictions on equal protection and on 
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due process. There is another subset that there are certain otherwise private organizations that 
could be subject to state sunshine laws or state right-to-know laws.  
 
The important thing that I think our monograph points out with that is that there is an in-
depth, factual analysis that courts go through on a case-by-case basis to assess whether or not 
an otherwise private enterprise should in some ways be more public as a state actor, subject 
to equal protection and due process requirements or subject to state or other sunshine laws. It 
is an intensive, fairly exhaustive, factual, case-by-case analysis that does not apply to the 
sector as a whole.7 
 
So, that is a synopsis of the second argument. 
 
The third argument for why foundation and other charity assets and organizations are public 
and operate with public money has to do with the tax-favored treatment. In essence, the 
argument is that foundations and other charities generally do not pay income taxes, sales 
taxes, property taxes; and donors are able to deduct charitable contributions to those 
organizations – within certain limits, obviously. This is money that would otherwise be 
collected in taxes and be available for the government, so the argument goes. Because it is no 
longer available, it is “public money” that is in the private sector, and it should be used to 
serve public purposes. It should be used with a quid pro quo-type analysis to ensure that all 
the public is getting served or everybody is getting their fair share or their equitable portion.8  
 
In How Public Is Private Philanthropy? Professor Brody and I present essentially five 
reasons – both together and in some ways independently, but there is some overlap – why the 
tax-favored-treatment analysis to support public money doesn’t work the way it is purported 
to work by some. I want to address three of those here. 
 
The first is the nature of the covenant between the donors who are getting the deduction and 
the government, the public, and the organizations that are benefiting from the exemption. The 
covenant is based on what is in the statutes and regulations. There is not much by way of 
legislative history, as you look at the exemption and the deduction statutes. The Revenue Act 
of 1894 mentions an exception for what we now call exempt organizations, recognizing that 
charities should not suffer under a bill imposing income tax obligations (on corporations). In 
1917 in the context of the First World War, there were those in Congress who suggested that 
a charitable deduction was worthwhile because otherwise there would be fewer funds to 
support the charitable work of organizations like the Red Cross.  
 
But as I said, there is not much in the legislative history; there is a void. And over the years, 
several different theories have been proposed to try to fill that void. Some of them are based 
on a subsidy theory – that the tax-favored treatment is essentially a subsidy from the 
government to these organizations. Other theories have focused on the tax base and how the 
government levies taxes, allows deductions, and treats expenses for the operations of 
foundations and other charities. There is a third group of theories that I gather under the 
thinking of “metabenefits”9; foundations and other charities provide such intangible but 
significant benefits to our society that to tax them or to not allow deductions would interfere 
with these higher-level benefits.  
 
                                                 
7 See How Public Is Private Philanthropy? p. 34. 
8 See How Public Is Private Philanthropy? pp. 43-47. 
9 See How Public Is Private Philanthropy? p. 48. 
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There are gaps in issues within each of these theories. There is no theory that covers 
everything that needs to be covered from beginning to end. Nonetheless there are great 
conversations to be had, mostly among legal scholars but in Congress as well, as there are 
practical implications.  
 
The covenant in the statutes is that these organizations – foundations and other charities – are 
obligated to pursue charitable purposes as defined under 501(c)(3) and accompanying 
regulations, section 170, which references the same thing for the deduction. They are not 
permitted to pursue or allow private benefit. There are a host of other statutory obligations – 
for instance, severe limits on lobbying with private foundations and absolute prohibitions on 
political activity. There is also the Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT) regiment, the 
[Section] 4940 regiment that applies to foundations, and [Section] 4950(a) and others.  
 
These are the obligations that the organizations are required to abide by. It is the covenant 
that exists between the organizations and government. Nothing about these obligations 
undermines the privateness, the independence, or the autonomy of the organizations. The 
covenant can put some boundaries around what is or is not deemed a “charitable purpose” – 
these organizations aren’t free to just go and do whatever it is they want regardless of 
anything else. They are expected and required to stay within the confines of the law. 
 
The second argument against the tax-favored treatment has to do with the inconsistencies we 
would have in the tax code and in tax policy if the exemption and deduction were to be 
treated differently than other tax-favored treatments from which individuals and for-profit 
businesses benefit. There is a legion of benefits that individuals and for-profits get by way of 
tax credits, deductions, et cetera, that has the same practical effect on the public treasury as 
does the exemption and the charitable contribution deduction; it is money that would 
otherwise be in government that is not; money that individuals and businesses are able to use 
in furtherance of their purposes consistent with the purposes of the tax-favored treatment. 
And yet these individuals and for-profit businesses are still private; they are still independent; 
and they are still autonomous.  
 
The argument does get made that the for-profit sector is not beyond further regulation; we do 
have a host of regulations in the for-profit sector. There are securities regulations, 
communications regulations, environmental regulations, and more. But those regulations do 
not evolve from the tax treatment. They evolve from other factors and other interests of the 
public and that government has in the regulation.  
 
The third opposition argument that I want to discuss very briefly, an inconsistency argument, 
is that governments do make grants directly; they do engage in contracts directly; and in the 
context of doing so they impose certain restrictions and conditions with which people are 
expected to comply. To treat the tax exemption and deduction, the tax-favored treatment for 
foundations and other charities, more harshly than the regiment associated with direct 
engagement by government seems an inconsistency that ought not to stand. Even direct 
engagement involves an element of choice by the organization engaging with government. 
An independent, autonomous, freely made choice to engage with the government in that way, 
and subject to accepting those particular conditions, is distinguishable from the exemption 
and the deduction, which is essentially a pact of engagement by government with the 
organizations where the decisions are actually made by private individuals or the private 
exempt organizations.  
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In conclusion, foundations and other charities, as I mentioned before, rest at a critical 
intersection, a critical focal point between the government and the business sector. 
Foundations and other charities are an important buffer in the interactions of those sectors, 
the interactions of all of us in our political, social, and economic systems. The autonomy and 
independence of the organizations in the sector are essential for idealism, creativity, 
inventiveness, and civic association, and they provide a key alternative to dependence on 
government and the whims of those in power.  
 
One of the key characteristics of the sector is the pluralism of the sector, which frankly is part 
of what allows us to have this conversation. Infringing on the delicate balances and essential 
attributes and neglecting centuries of precedent should not certainly be done lightly. Our 
monograph concludes that it should not be done on the basis of the public money argument. 
 
GLENN LAMMI: I would like to start today with a quote from Thomas Jefferson, which will 
set the tone nicely for my talk. He said that America should have, “A wise and frugal 
government, which shall leave men free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and 
improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned – this is the 
sum of good government.”10 
 
This quote appears in the excellent Philanthropy Roundtable monograph we are discussing 
today, and supports the statement of authors John Tyler and Professor Evelyn Brody that, “It 
should go without saying—but in the case of the public-money theory, it unfortunately 
cannot—that the limitation of government in order to preserve liberty is one of the bedrock 
principles of our constitutional regime.”11 
 
It also seemed to me, when Washington Legal Foundation began to look at these issues more 
closely a year ago, that it goes without saying that the government’s decision to forego 
taxation of something or someone through an exemption or allowing a deduction doesn’t 
necessarily make that something or someone all of a sudden public. For instance, the federal 
government allows me to take a tax deduction on my home mortgage interest and property 
taxes. But does that allow the government to require that I hang an American flag on my 
home or display a “Save Darfur” sign on my front lawn? When I purchased my hybrid car, 
the federal government gave me a $500 tax credit. But can it then force me to adorn my car 
with an “I’ll give you my gun when you take it from my cold, dead hands!” bumper sticker, 
or one declaring “meat is murder”? (Laughter.) 
 
Clearly, my assumption was naïve, given how easily some in government and even the 
philanthropic world assume that private money donated or received for charitable purposes is 
in fact a government subsidy, and thus “public money” or “our” money. Washington Legal 
Foundation is thus grateful for Professor Brody and Mr. Tyler’s exhaustive and compelling 
analysis of the “public money” issue. 
 
Rather than expound further upon the legal and public policy issues that explain why private 
charity is not public money, which John Tyler has done so well here already, I would like to 
talk about why it is so important to have solid scholarship on this particular issue. The notion 
that charitable money is wholly or partially public money underlies an effort to inject 
                                                 
10 President Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1801. Cited in How Public Is Private 
Philanthropy? in footnote 105 on page 59. 
11 How Public Is Private Philanthropy? at 59. 
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government deeper into the private management and missions of foundations and the 
nonprofits they support. 
 
Federal law and ages-old common law lay out the limits of government oversight of 
charitable institutions very clearly. Marion Freemont-Smith of the Hauser Center for 
Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard’s Kennedy School put it best when she wrote that the 
law’s proper role “is to ensure that each charitable organization is carrying out the purposes 
for which it was established, and that its managers are not obtaining personal benefits from 
their positions at the expense of the charity. With few exceptions, the law neither attempts to 
control the decisions of managers, made in good faith, as to how the purposes will be 
achieved, nor how their organizations will be administered.”12 The last part of Ms. Freemont-
Smith’s quote is a very inconvenient truth for some organizations and public officials who 
feel that foundations and other charities do far too little to directly and substantially assist 
what they call “marginalized or vulnerable groups” in society. 
 
This perception was put into action last year as the Greenlining Institute and others sought 
passage in California of the Foundation Diversity and Transparency Act, better known as AB 
624.13 On its face, the proposal appeared benign: foundations should provide the public with 
more information about their organization and their charitable giving. I think it was sold that 
way very effectively at the beginning. When you look closely at the specific information 
sought, though, it laid bare the sponsors’ true intentions. It asked of foundations, “What race 
or gender are the members of your board? How much do you give to groups serving 
‘specific’ marginalized communities?” I must note here that the bill specified only 7 minority 
designations out of the 126 cited as distinct in the last census. It would seem the other 119 
need to increase their contributions to California Assembly members. “How much do you 
give to groups whose boards include members of those 7 minority groups?” 
 
The proposal measures a foundation’s success at helping the poor or oppressed not through 
its competence or creativity, but through its meeting some vague numerical goal of what is 
“enough.” Two officials from Community Advocates, Inc., a leading Los Angeles nonprofit 
focusing on human and race relations in the city, decried that the proposal was, “An 
unprecedented intrusion by government into the realm of charitable giving . . . it is the first 
step in setting government-mandated priorities as to where charitable dollars should go.”14 
There was a great deal of opposition to the law itself. Unfortunately — in our opinion — ten 
California foundations got the message; they pledged to make multi-million, multi-year 
investments in minority communities, and AB 624 was dropped.15 
 
The idea has not gone away. Greenlining has of course carried its mission on to other states, 
such as Florida and Pennsylvania, though without success. Recently, the group issued a 
breathtakingly unscientific report on the percentage of “people of color” on foundations’ 
                                                 
12 Andras Kosaras, A Conversation with Marion R. Freemont-Smith, Found. News and Comment, Sept.-Oct. 
2004, at 21-2. 
13 On April 7, 2008, Hudson Institute’s Bradley Center hosted a panel discussion on this topic featuring John 
Gamboa, the executive director of the Greenlining Institute. The complete transcript can be found online at: 
http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=hudson_upcoming_events&id=528  
14 John Gizzi, Race and Gender Quotas for Nonprofits: How California Bill AB 624 Threatens Foundation 
Philanthropy, Foundation Watch (Capital Research Ctr), July 2008, at 6 (quoting David A. Lehrer and Joe R. 
Hicks). 
15 Id. at 1. 
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boards, limited this time to only three minority groups and including a Scarlet-letter-like 
asterisk by those foundations that didn’t respond to their information requests.16 
 
The problem with Greenlining’s approach was best summed up by a Heinz Endowment 
spokesperson who, when asked why they didn’t respond with the data the group sought from 
Pennsylvania foundations, replied, “Reducing an important issue, and a complex one, to a 
single data point is shallow methodology.”17 
 
And then we have the more recent Criteria for Philanthropy at its Best,18 issued by the 
National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy (NCRP). Paul Brest of the William and 
Flora Hewlett Foundation, who is very well respected in the philanthropy community as well 
as the constitutional law community and who also happens to be a donor to NCRP, wrote in 
May that Criteria “concealed Greenlining’s fist in a velveteen glove.”19 Among other things, 
NCRP’s Criteria tells foundations that they don’t practice “philanthropy at its best” if they 
aren’t providing 50 percent of their grant dollars to “benefit lower-income communities, 
communities of color, and other marginalized groups, broadly defined,” and devoting “at 
least 25 percent of… grant dollars for advocacy, organizing and civic engagement.”  
 
Now as an advocacy organization, Washington Legal Foundation would be thrilled if 25 
percent of all the foundations out there would give their money for that. Whether that is 
something that is good for everybody, however, is open to question. Mr. Brest decried this as 
“philanthropy by the numbers,” where numbers are a “crude proxy for impact.”20 
 
Of course, it’s entirely up to foundations to ignore NCRP’s Criteria. But if the criteria were 
to be embraced as government policy, that would be an entirely different matter. NCRP’s 
Aaron Dorfman assures us that, “I don’t believe that politicians should decide where 
foundation dollars go any more than I believe the government should mandate how much 
protein should be in a frozen pizza.”21 
 
However, as NCRP put it in a prepublication copy of its Criteria report, “Policymakers may 
consider the criteria valuable when considering regulations or legislation that affect 
institutional grantmaking.”22 Members of Congress on committees with tax-related oversight 
who concur with NCRP and others on the concept that money donated is public money,23 are 
certainly prepared to step into this fray. We’ve heard from a member of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, Xavier Becerra, that he has “intense concern”24 over how the poor and 
disadvantaged get short shrift from charities, and that “we’re not trying to mandate 
                                                 
16 The Greenlining Institute, Diversity of Foundation Boards of Directors, Issue Brief, Apr. 2009. 
17 The Latest Charity Shakedown, Wall St. J. , Nov. 5, 2008. 
18 Available at http://www.ncrp.org/paib. The Bradley Center held a panel discussion on this publication on May 
28, 2009, a complete transcript of which can be found online at: 
http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=hudson_upcoming_events&id=665  
19 Paul Brest, NCRP at its Most Presumptuous, The Huffington Post, Mar. 5, 2009, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-brest/ncrp-at-its-most-presumpt_b_172086.html. 
20 Paul Brest, Philanthropy by the Numbers, The Huffington Post, Apr. 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-brest/philanthropy-by-the-numbe_b_182784.html. 
21 Ian Wilhelm, Nonprofit Leaders Debate Question of Disclosing Demographic Data, Chron. of Philanthropy, 
Nov. 27, 2008, available at http://philanthropy.com/premium/articles/v21/i04/04001201.htm. 
22 Supra note 9. 
23 See Suzanne Perry, Paying it Forward – and Back, Chron. of Philanthropy, Sept. 2, 2008, available at 
http://philanthropy.com/premuim/articles/v20/i22/22000601. 
24 Howard Husock, Nobody Does it Better, Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 2008. 
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something, but we will if you don’t act.”25 We’ve also heard from Senate Finance Committee 
ranking member Charles Grassley,“It’s fair to look at what benefits charities provide in return 
for the preferential tax treatment they and their donors receive.”26 
 
In the grand scheme of issues facing this country, I’d like to think that changing the tax code 
or somehow circumscribing what constitutes a “public purpose” would be way off 
Washington’s radar, but as Rep. Becerra and others constantly remind us, there’s gold in 
them hills – billions in foregone tax revenues. 
 
In Washington Legal Foundation’s opinion, what we have seen over the past several years is 
just the latest iteration of a decades-long effort to more narrowly define what is “in the public 
interest” and thus what merits charitable tax preferences. Whether that is done by government 
fiat or subtle and not-so-subtle non-governmental advocacy and education, it is not in the best 
interest of the public, and especially not in the best interest of the “underserved.” 
 
The beauty of American philanthropy and the civil society it has created is its diversity, with 
a universe of benevolent foundations and charities taking a variety of approaches to address 
what they see as society’s most pressing problems. I really saw this walking here today down 
Massachusetts Avenue, seeing the buildings of Brookings Institution, the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, and the 
Peterson Foundation, a constellation of nonprofits that are all doing good work, trying to get 
things done for society.  
 
Congress clearly intended a broad, pluralistic approach to what constitutes a charity, not a 
narrowly defined one. Seeking “social justice” as defined by Greenlining or NCRP is not the 
mission of many foundations and the nonprofits they support. They would not only be 
violating their donors’ intentions if they shifted half of their giving to the “underserved,” they 
would be leaving the public issues to which they are devoted – pardon the repetition here – 
underserved. Organizations which broadly support causes like the arts, health research, aging, 
education, and military veterans provide benefits to marginalized groups, but would it be 
enough to retain full tax benefits? 
 
Would nonprofits which are dedicated to the underserved but do so in a non-traditional way 
meet NCRP’s standards? Would the St. Bernard Project, which is rebuilding houses for 
people of all races and financial statuses affected by Hurricane Katrina, measure up?27 Or 
would Robert Woodson’s innovative Center for Neighborhood Enterprise?28 Or the Careers 
Through Culinary Arts Program, which promotes foodservice career opportunities for lower-
income youth?29 I think it’s very important for those who see foundations and other charities 
merely as private managers of public money to ask themselves, do I really want government 
so profoundly involved in philanthropy? 
 
Foundations and charitable organizations work because they aren’t the government. Teresa 
Odendahl, a former chair of NCRP, has said, “At its best, philanthropy provides a check 
                                                 
25 Congress Targets Philanthropy, Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 2008. 
26 Supra note 13. 
27 See http://www.stbernardproject.org/v158/. 
28 See http://www.cneonline.org/. 
29 See http://www.ccapinc.org/. 
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against corporate or government domination or indifference.”30 If she’s right, and I think 
most would agree she is, then how can more government benefit philanthropy? 
 
As someone who works for a legal policy nonprofit, my view is that we need more, not 
fewer, voices and advocates out there on all sides of issues. A group like Washington Legal 
Foundation fills a void in the courts and the court of public opinion, and advances ideas and 
arguments that either don’t get considered or get short shrift with these key audiences. 
Clearly all the best ideas don’t emanate from government, and we need a lot of good ideas 
right now. 
 
Leaders in the foundation world such as Pablo Eisenberg (in attendance), 31 Pew Charitable 
Trusts’ Rebecca Rimel,32 and Kauffman Foundation’s Carl Schramm have called on 
foundations to be bolder and take more risks. But will that be any more likely with the 
government more involved in setting and judging foundations’ missions? Will the poor and 
disadvantaged really benefit from the political logrolling and special-interest favors that will 
ultimately result from a politicization of charity?  
 
Even if some in government say they won’t get that involved, they just can’t help themselves. 
For instance, it’s only been several weeks since President Obama pledged to take a hands-off 
approach to the management of General Motors, but already we have members of Congress 
from both parties calling to ask the nominal GM CEO to save distribution centers and plants 
in their districts.33 
 
And, finally, while the proponents of more government involvement may reap benefits from 
it today, what about four, eight, or twelve years from now? What if Washington comes under 
new management? What if that management feels that foundations and nonprofits that 
support humane treatment of terror suspects, socialized medicine, and limits on carbon 
emissions and same-sex marriage are working against the public interest?  
 
I started with a reference from the Philanthropy Roundtable monograph, and as a nice 
bookend, I will end with one. This from Jennifer Wolch, dean of the UC-Berkeley’s College 
of Environmental Design, who wrote in 1990 that, “The most troubling dilemma of the 
shadow state is that the voluntary sector may become a puppet or pawn in the service of goals 
that are antithetical to their organizational mission. Organizations that don’t conform or are 
not ‘ideologically correct’ from the perspective of the state at that given historical moment 
may be denied access to direct and even indirect resources.”34 This is as relevant and thought 
provoking today as it was almost twenty years ago. 
 
Thank you. 
                                                 
30 Over Two Decades of Philanthropic Reform, Georgetown Center for Public & Nonprofit Leadership, 
presented by Teresa Odendahl, Jan. 24, 2003, at 1, available at 
http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/doc_pool/Nielsen0206Odendahl.pdf. 
31 Governance and Accountability in America’s Foundation, Georgetown Center for Public & Nonprofit 
Leadership, Issue Forum, Jan. 29, 2004, at 23 (statement of Mr. Eisenberg responding to a question), available 
at http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/doc_pool/IF01Governance.pdf. 
32 See, e.g., Rebecca W. Rimel, The Walter and Leonore Annenberg Distinguished Lecture in Communication: 
Philanthropy, Philosophy, and Philadelphia 7 (Oct. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/speech_rwr_annenberg.pdf. 
33 Robert Farago, Washington Can’t be ‘Hands Off’ with GM, Wall St. J. June 12, 2009. 
34 Jennifer R. Wolch, The Shadow State: Government and Voluntary Sector in Transition 217 (1990), cited in 
How Public Is Private Philanthropy? in footnote 21 on page 21. 
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RAY MADOFF (pronounced “mad-off”): This has been an incredibly interesting discussion. 
Now just so it’s not a distraction, let me just start off by explaining a few things about my 
name. With regard to my first name, no, I am not a man. As for my last name, more recently 
I’ve had to start saying to people that, no, I’m not related, don’t know him, never met him. 
(Laughter.) 
 
It is a pleasure for me to be here to participate in this important discussion. In an era in which 
there has been an increasing tendency for people to speak only to those who have similar 
viewpoints as theirs, I think that the Bradley Center for Philanthropy and Civic Renewal 
stands out as a place which has consistently been bringing together people with diverse views 
to discuss some of the most important issues of the day. They should be commended, and it is 
a real pleasure to be a part of it. It certainly sounds like they are continuing that tradition 
today. 
 
This report by the Philanthropy Roundtable addresses the question, how public is private 
philanthropy? In the report the authors suggest that there has been a mischaracterization of 
philanthropic organizations and their assets as being essentially “public,” and that this 
mischaracterization has resulted in inappropriate interventions as well as threats of legislation 
regarding the operation and governance of charitable organizations. While the authors don’t 
spell out the proposals they object to, they allude to a number of initiatives, including those 
that seek to cap compensation paid to trustees and other proposals – I assume the one by 
NCRP (Criteria for Philanthropy at Its Best) – designed to encourage organizations to serve 
the poor and marginalized groups. 
 
The implication of the Philanthropy Roundtable report is that if private philanthropy were 
more accurately characterized as private rather than public, then we would not see this type 
of meddling. Moreover ,the report goes even further to suggest that this mischaracterization 
of charitable organizations – being public as opposed to private – is going to lead to a 
futuristic dystopia in which (and here I quote from page 39), “The philanthropic sector would 
no longer be a product of pluralistic choices freely made regarding the expenditure of 
monetary and human resources.” 
 
It all sounds like pretty serious stuff. However, in my comments today I would like to suggest 
that the authors of the report miss the mark in framing the question as they do, and that a 
more nuanced approach to the problem would provide a more nuanced – and ultimately more 
helpful – answer.  
 
The report takes a complicated question – how should we think about the financing and 
obligations of charitable organizations in our society – and attempts to convert it to a question 
of taxonomy – are charitable organizations essentially “public” or essentially “private.” The 
unstated promise of this framing is that once we have successfully categorized philanthropy, 
then all of the hard questions will go away.  
 
The problem with this framing is two-fold. First of all I take issue with whether it accurately 
characterizes the terms of the debate. Despite the assertions made in the report and some of 
the comments today, I am not aware of any reputable person saying that charitable 
organizations are public organizations just like branches of the government, or that their 
assets are “public assets” just like the state or federal treasury. Maybe these things are being 
said and I’ve missed them, but to me these are not the terms of the debate that I have been 
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reading about. The authors expend an awful lot of energy striking down these points, but they 
really just represent a straw man, and it does little to advance the discussion. 
 
Secondly, the more troubling problem with their analysis is that even if the authors were 
successful in categorizing charitable organizations as 100 percent private, this would not 
deliver the promised “hands-off” results. Private entities are not insulated from outsiders 
seeking to regulate their affairs for the good of the public. As the concept of stakeholder has 
taken root, we as a society have come to see that you need not be an owner in order to have a 
significant interest in an entity’s activities. Private companies, just like charitable 
organizations, are frequently asked whether their activities are consistent with the public 
good. And if you are going to turn to the world of proposed state legislation, there is a litany 
of state legislation proposed to say that corporations chartered in their state should meet 
standards a, b and c. 
 
Moreover, it should not be surprising that whenever there is a large investment of public 
resources in private enterprises – as there clearly is in the charitable field – there is often an 
increased measure of public oversight. Consider for example the recent pay czar who has 
been appointed to oversee the salaries of companies receiving Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) money. For those of you who read today’s Wall Street Journal, right on the front 
page they have an article about the CEOs of bailed-out banks who flew to resorts on firm’s 
jets. This was about people going to Greenbrier on private jets after getting a government 
handout. No one is saying that these companies are public, that we own their assets, but they 
are subject to an increased level of scrutiny because of this investment of capital.  
 
I feel that public-versus-private is the wrong question. But if it is the wrong question, what is 
the right one? The appropriate question we should be asking ourselves today is whether we 
are satisfied with the current state of affairs. Regardless of whether the public are “owners” of 
charitable entities, through the tax code we as taxpayers are investing billions of dollars each 
year in the charitable sector. We need to ask ourselves, are we getting everything we want out 
of the investment? 
 
Our world today reflects the results of a bold experiment. Historically there was a period in 
the nineteenth century – which I won’t go into – where the world was very different. 
Charities had to be chartered by the government. They had to get absolute public approval. 
Since then, we’ve pursued this bold experiment where we’ve established a very broadly 
encompassing definition of what constitutes “charitable,” one that enables people to choose 
equally among purposes as broad as “for the betterment of mankind” to purposes as narrow 
as “for the preservation of Huey aircraft.” And they’re all fine; they’re all charitable. If 
you’re wondering, Huey aircraft were used in Vietnam –but then again, if you’re wondering, 
then maybe the folks who work toward the preservation of Huey aircraft should be doing a 
better job. (Laughter.) 
 
The second feature of our experiment is that we have provided extremely generous subsidies 
for these endeavors through our tax code. Yes, charities don’t pay tax on income. But even 
greater than that is the deduction for “charitable” for income tax purposes, which is limited, 
but there is also an unlimited deduction for estate tax purposes. Throughout we have lots of 
generous subsidies, and the subsidy is the same regardless of the particular charitable purpose 
chosen.  
 
Finally, we impose few obligations on the operation of these organizations.  
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It strikes me that it is totally appropriate for us to consider the results of the experiment – 
particularly in this time of real economic need, when the government has more demands on 
its resources and fewer tax dollars to meet these demands. Perhaps we are happy with what 
we see. But for those who are not, it is not surprising that there is some pressure to modify 
the circumstances that brought us to this place.  
 
If we consider the issue of easy entry to status as charitable organizations, perhaps this should 
be tightened up. This has been done in England in recent years, where the most recent 
charities act provides stricter meaning of what it means to be charitable. Schools will no 
longer be presumed to qualify if they merely educate paying students; they must serve 
additional public benefits.  
 
Moreover, in this country as well the contours of what makes something “charitable” have 
regularly been subject to reflection and modification. I want to touch on two examples from 
the past fifty years. Firstly, the 1969 legislation significantly revamped what types of 
donations would qualify for the charitable deduction, and cut back on things which people 
felt should qualify but the government said, no, the charities aren’t getting enough resources. 
Secondly, there’s the 1983 Supreme Court Bob Jones case, which I think is particularly 
important to remember today. That was a case that was litigated all the way up to the 
Supreme Court addressing the issue about whether a school which discriminates on the basis 
of race should be considered charitable. The Supreme Court said, no. This reflected a 
significant shift from prior law. 
 
If we consider the issue of generous financial support, perhaps we can no longer afford a full 
deduction for transfers to charities. Particularly if it is the case that little money is going 
towards those who are most in need.  
 
I must add one thing here: There was much mention about the legislative history, but How 
Public Is Private Philanthropy? failed to mention the more recent legislative history – from 
the 1938 legislation on. The deduction is discussed – and this was quoted by the Supreme 
Court in Bob Jones – as follows: “The exemption from taxation of money and property 
devoted to charitable and other purposes is based on the theory that the government is 
compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would 
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public funds and by the benefits 
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.” I wasn’t aware of this legislative history 
but that sounds pretty quid pro quo to me! 
 
In the report, the authors suggest that health care and education for the poor are better 
addressed through public dollars than through private philanthropy. If that’s the case perhaps 
we should go through that route, but if we go that route we are going to need the money from 
somewhere.  
 
I personally don’t think we should be cutting back on the charitable deduction, but I certainly 
think it is something that should be considered if we want to have this let-everybody-do-
what-they-want route. 
 
Finally, the issue that is most likely to attract legislative change is the lack of oversight of 
private charitable organizations. Perhaps it no longer makes sense to simply trust 
organizations to “do the right thing.” We have seen time and time again that while many 
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organizations pursue excellence, others fall short of the mark. This is true both in the public 
and private sector. Perhaps it is now time to adopt provisions that would increase the 
likelihood of charitable dollars being used to fulfill charitable purposes. 
 
The drafters of the report use an excellent example to support their argument that there 
should be a “hands-off” approach, and that’s the idea that just because you get a home 
mortgage deduction, it doesn’t mean that the government can tell you how to decorate your 
house – or your car, with the bumper stickers. It’s a really compelling example, and I think 
it’s worth a response. The problem with this argument is that it fails to take into account the 
relative purposes of the deductions. The home mortgage deduction is designed to encourage 
the purchase of residential homes. Once a home is purchased, the purpose of the deduction 
has been fulfilled. 
 
In contrast, the purpose of the charitable deduction is not fulfilled simply by transferring the 
property to a foundation or donor-advised fund. The transfer of assets from one bank account 
to another does nothing for the betterment of the world. In order for the purpose of the 
charitable deduction to be fulfilled, the money needs to be put to charitable use. In order to 
increase the likelihood of this happening, there are areas that are ripe for oversight. These 
include a limitation, or even elimination, on fees paid to trustees and a limitation on 
administrative expenses. It might not be appropriate to grant a charitable deduction to 
organizations that spend more money on administrative expenses than they do on fulfilling 
their charitable mission. Finally maybe we should have a requirement that charities spend 
more of their assets currently, rather than in hoarding them for a future that may never come. 
 
These changes would not interfere with charities; they would simply define what it means to 
be a charity – this is the question we need to constantly ask ourselves. 
 
RALPH SMITH: If this were a more culturally attuned audience, this is a point where you 
would say, and the church says, “Amen!” (Laughter)  
 
In an audience filled with law professors, I have to admit that I read the Philanthropy 
Roundtable report How Public Is Private Philanthropy? carefully, but I didn’t read all the 
footnotes. (Laughter.) So if there is something in the footnotes, I didn’t get it. I also have to 
say that in an audience with both John Edie and Andrew Schulz (former general council and 
current deputy general counsel for the Council on Foundations, respectively), two people who 
know more about this than anybody else, I feel as if I have some backup here, should it be 
needed. But Bill (Schambra) has always been kind to me; he has not required me to meet the 
absolute-certainty test that generally is required for these types of engagements. So he has 
allowed me to come often with as many questions as answers. With that in mind, let me offer 
a couple of additional observations. 
 
First, I think this was a really good piece of work, and I really encourage everybody to read 
it. I think there is an implicit plea for some language discipline; the authors make that point. 
But then in many of their own arguments, they seem to conflate philanthropy generally with 
philanthropy as practiced by foundations. It feels to me that there is an important distinction 
to be made that has a whole lot to do with the arguments that are put forward.  
 
As importantly – and I think we heard it here today – in this discussion of public and private, 
“public” gets defined as “government.” It loads the argument; if you figure out your position 
on government, you figure out what side of this argument you are on. It feels to me, as Ray 
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(Madoff) suggested, that there is a more nuanced conversation that we need to have. I don’t 
know anybody who has really taken the strong view about government.  
 
I think How Public Is Private Philanthropy? does a fairly decent job, and it’s a really good 
refutation of the broadest public money argument. But in many respects, because it is the 
broadest argument, it is the one virtually no one makes. So there is sort of a straw-man 
quality to the debate. As such, it feels as though this is a very good piece of writing about a 
very narrow point, and one that’s not going to really be debated by very many people just 
simply on the merits as stated.  
 
The lynchpin of the argument is this “original bargain” or “covenant.” There are echoes of 
original intent. For those folks who believe in original intent – that that ought to be the 
interpretation – there is a tilting towards believing that there is more there than there is. It 
feels as if when it all comes down to it, this original bargain or this covenant finds its root in 
the debate and decisions around the Internal Revenue Code, particularly around section 
501(c)(3). If that bargain or covenant is grounded in a provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code, unless one also makes an argument of pre-emption, then in many respects it suggests 
that this argument fails in at least fifty states.  
 
The argument on one hand is overly narrow, and on the other hand it overreaches quite a bit. I 
would love to hear the authors talk about that. The argument, as thorough as it is, doesn’t 
respond to some of the knotty questions that I think are important, the ones really worth 
chewing on a bit. For example, 501(c)(3) imposes significant restrictions on political 
involvement, involvement in political campaigns and lobbying. This is a real incursion on 
what one would normally think of as First Amendment rights. If 501(c)(3) could do that, then 
what else could it not do? Why is it that we would say, that is part of the original bargain? 
But as far as inviting, and directing, and wondering out loud about whether more public 
benefits should go someplace, why is that a deeper incursion on private decision making than 
burdening private decision making with a limitation on First Amendment rights? This seems 
to me an interesting question that is worth discussing. I don’t have a good answer for it, but I 
suspect that we ought to talk about it.  
 
If donor intent is unclear, ambiguous, or is made irrelevant or illegal by the passage of time, 
who decides? Are we willing to admit there is a role for government or for the public sector, 
however one defines it? And does that make it “public money” or are we saying that there is a 
legitimate role over and above barely enforcing the “no private benefit” rule?  
 
As we think about the conversion foundations which have come out of Blue Cross Blue 
Shield, when a nonprofit decides that it really should do better as a for-profit and somebody 
steps in to take a look at those assets and figure out what to do with them, isn’t there a 
legitimate role there? And how is that legitimate role consistent with the underlying bargain, 
over and above just making sure there is no private benefit?  
 
Should the current board of directors or board of trustees of the Annie E. Casey Foundation, 
and those of us who manage that institution have precisely the same discretion and scope of 
authority in decision making as Jim Casey, who founded it and named it after his mother? 
Does the passage of time and does succession do anything to this?  
 
Are there circumstances under which size matters? In the private sector we understand that 
sometimes to preserve competition we ought to pay attention to monopolies. If on the 
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philanthropic side we now have foundations whose assets are larger than the gross national 
product of some countries, does that raise a question? And if one could imagine the ten 
largest foundations getting together and deciding to go in a particular direction, would that 
combination of assets so tilt the field that the pluralism that we celebrate could be 
compromised? And if that pluralism is compromised, who should do what?  
 
My concern is that the certainty around this original bargain does not address the real issues 
and challenges that are being raised. It feels to me that what Aaron Dorfman and his 
colleagues at the NCRP might be inviting (with their publication of Criteria for Philanthropy 
at Its Best) is a sort of a public conversation that goes beyond 501(c)(3), a conversation along 
the lines that Ray Madoff just outlined. It may be that it’s time for our version of a 
constitutional amendment within this area, or a constitutional convention, because it seems as 
if this is not outside the realm of public – not government, but of public – decision making.  
 
I want to use this report as an invitation and the opening of a public conversation or broader 
conversation without accepting its position that somehow we will do irreparable injury to the 
delicate balance struck by the original bargain or the covenant. It feels to me that 
philanthropy writ large is strong enough, broad enough, well embraced enough to engage in 
that conversation, a conversation which in many respects could be long overdue. It’s a 
conversation which might essentially take us in some exciting new directions, and in 
directions that would be consistent with the notion that philanthropy is where we find the best 
expression of idealism, the best potential for creativity, and the best embodiment of the 
diversity and the pluralism which we celebrate as a nation.  
 
(Applause)  
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: That was a terrific series of opening statements. Ralph (Smith) let 
me just ask you this: I suspected this report, this monograph, was prompted in part because, 
in the convention centers that host the Council on Foundations year after year, there has been 
sort of an unchecked flow of rhetoric that this is public money without a great deal of 
pondering the questions which you have raised – and through no fault of your own, who is 
always scrupulously careful about these matters. But nonetheless, I wonder what your view 
of that is, and your fellow panelists should of course join in. I don’t mean to put you on the 
spot as the chairman of the board of the Council on Foundations! But what would be your 
posture towards that rhetoric in general? Surely you have heard it; of course you have never 
indulged in it. Is that possibly one of the reasons for the monograph being considered to be 
necessary by legal sticklers? 
 
RALPH SMITH: When a certain congressman said that philanthropy was a $30-billion-dollar 
earmark – er, who’s counting, a $42-billion-dollar earmark – I must admit that came as a bit 
of a surprise to me. That was never the way that I thought of philanthropy. I think there is a 
lot of shorthand, and the public conversation has been lacking in nuance, but I think people 
say “public money” when they mean to say “public benefit money.” So the truth of the matter 
is, I discount it a great deal, because I think most of us understand that there is kind of a 
gradation going on here. We are really talking about the benefit and how we all try to make 
sure philanthropy is more effective. And we have significant disagreements about that, but I 
don’t believe that there is any groundswell within the Council on Foundations or among 
foundations generally to compromise the autonomy or the essentially private nature of 
philanthropy. What I think there is is probably a lack of language discipline on both sides of 
the aisle on this one.  
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WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: Glenn (Lammi) and John (Tyler), there’s a very interesting point 
that Ralph (Smith) and Ray (Madoff) both raised. Having dispatched possibly with the notion 
that this is public money, nonetheless there is an understanding of charity – as Professor 
Madoff points out – which has led to restrictions of various sorts on the use of charitable 
dollars on behalf of public purposes. How does that square with the underlying argument of 
your monograph, in the definition of charity which often imports public purposes, i.e. no 
involvement in campaigns, no overt lobbying efforts? Is that an unconstitutional 
infringement? Some people argue that, incidentally, and some people on the left even make 
the argument that to keep nonprofits and foundations from advocacy is an infringement of 
First Amendment rights. How would you wrestle with that issue?  
 
JOHN TYLER: Evelyn (Brody) and I did wrestle with that issue, and frankly continue to 
wrestle with the issue. I think all the panelists made wonderful points – and in fact helped 
make the points for us – that this is a complicated conversation; it is a nuanced conversation; 
and there are sledge hammer elements to the conversation as well. This is one of those 
elements. 
 
One of the things that the monograph does not stand for is the proposition that the sector 
cannot be regulated. That is not what we are saying. There are appropriately applicable 
statues and regulations to help determine what organizations in the sector are able to do, and 
what the limits are. Congress does have certain rights as Congress, and state legislators have 
rights to be able to impose certain restrictions.  
 
Part of what the monograph is getting to, though, is the question, what is the basis for the 
restriction? What is the basis for the conditions with the “no political activity” restriction? Is 
that an imposition on these organizations because it’s public money? Or, is it an imposition to 
help better define and better restrict the ability of individuals, or individual organizations, to 
use the money in furtherance of their private purposes towards a particular political agenda? 
There is an argument that can be made that the particular political agenda is in fact a private 
purpose as oppose to a charitable purpose. So the restrictions and the conditions are not based 
on the notion that it is “public money,” but rather on other purposes to be served, like 
defining “charitable purpose.” 
 
GLENN LAMMI: I think that the issue of political involvement and the use of money for 
those sorts of ends may necessitate another monograph of sorts. I think it really is an 
interesting issue that Ralph (Smith) raised – if government is able to restrict someone’s 
ability to speak that way, what else can’t it do? I think one of the reasons why Congress 
decided to keep charitable organizations out of politics was the fear of politicization of the 
entity itself. But I think that compelling arguments can be made that in certain situations, 
getting involved in lobbying for a specific bill is the best way to meet a public purpose. 
Ultimately laws are passed by Congress through the process which involves lobbying.  
 
I honestly wonder: if more charitable institutions were involved in lobbying, would there be 
this horrible aura around the concept? It seems so distasteful for people to give money to 
lobbyists to go out and advocate for what they do. But how much different is what lobbyists 
do from what a lot of organizations like Washington Legal and others that are involved in 
advocacy and education do? 
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JOHN TYLER: I would also add, and Evelyn (Brody) will remember because I’ve forgotten 
which case – there’s a court case which addressed this specific issue in some ways. Part of 
the reason the court came down on the side of the public, or the political activity restriction 
being legitimate or not an infringement on First Amendment rights, is that there is an avenue 
for these organizations to voice their speech – that is, through setting up companion 501(c)(4) 
organizations. So there is not an absolute bar, an absolute prohibition, because of this 
alternative avenue. 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: Ray (Madoff)? 
 
RAY MADOFF: That leads to a follow-up question: It seems like a lot of the discussion is 
about getting one’s rights to do various things taken away, but one can lobby, for example; 
one just can’t lobby as a tax-exempt organization. So, don’t take the charitable deduction for 
the donors, and then do whatever you want! No oversight! No one tells you what to do! 
 
JOHN TYLER: And you have broader rights and broader freedom than would otherwise 
exist. 
 
RAY MADOFF: Absolutely! You would get a lot of agreement with that. You could maybe 
have two types of organizations for choices of these activities. 
 
JOHN TYLER: And there are donors who have made those choices and who are making 
those choices not to pursue the tax deductibility. They are either setting up for-profit 
enterprises, nonprofit enterprises that are not tax exempt, or offshore enterprises. 
 
RAY MADOFF: Then why isn’t that an answer to this problem? It’s not really a question of 
rights. You have this other avenue available to you. 
 
JOHN TYLER: We are now talking about the potential for changing the dynamic of a very 
important sector that has been around for centuries. People have those rights, they have those 
choices, and they have had those choices, those other opportunities and other avenues. But 
the sector as it exists now is still one of those legitimate choices, subject to the restrictions 
and requirements that do exist. 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: Let’s go to the audience – we have a terrific and distinguished 
audience!  
 
ROGER REAM, The Fund for American Studies: I’m a little bit troubled with the discussion 
so far, and would like to ask Mr. Tyler if he could respond to an argument that Professor 
Madoff made about the subsidy issue.  
 
I’m the president of a nonprofit and I don’t view my organization as having any taxpayers 
investing in it, or it being subsidized by the government in any way, because we don’t take 
direct government grants. Maybe the analogy would be, if you have two soda choices, Coca 
Cola and Pepsi, and the government comes along and puts a ten-cent tax on Pepsi, I don’t 
view that as subsidizing Coca Cola; I view that as penalizing Pepsi.  
 
It seems to me that Professor Madoff would accept the idea that the nonprofit sector is getting 
a $42 billion dollar earmark from Congress because of the exemption. And I think, Mr. Tyler, 
you were too quick in that last response to concede that because there are alternatives, 
 22
therefore that allows government to impose regulations on the nonprofit sector. I would say 
that case may be flawed. I’m particularly concerned about efforts to clamp down on First 
Amendment rights of clergymen and issues like that. 
 
JOHN TYLER: I didn’t intend to concede that point. If I did, I retract my answer! (Laughter)  
 
The issue of subsidy is actually a very complicated issue. Ralph (Smith) pointed out that 
some of what we are arguing or dealing with ourselves, even in the monograph, is the issue of 
semantics. We went to some length in the introduction, talking about the semantic difficulties 
that exist in the sector as it relates to the term “public money,” as it relates to “public charity” 
and “private foundation.” “Subsidy” is one of those words we don’t actually talk about 
specifically in the introduction. But there are different ways to look at it. Some folks think 
that if it’s not in the public treasury and it otherwise could be, it’s a subsidy. Some folks will 
drill down and say, well, subsidy is only those direct, concrete, tangible decisions made by 
government to send money from point a to point b; they’re distinguishing a direct subsidy 
from what might be considered a passive subsidy, where it is not government making the 
decision.  
 
In the US Supreme Court case Walz v. Tax Commission, Justice Brennan in his concurring 
opinion talks about this distinction and characterizes indirect subsidies as “pregnant with 
involvement” by government. And he characterizes direct subsidies as “involving 
government forcibly diverting taxpayer income to the recipient” whereas an exemption is 
government refraining from devoting to its own uses income independently generated 
through voluntary contributions. So even the Supreme Court is wrestling with this distinction 
on subsidy, what it means, and what the semantic issues associated with are.  
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: So, Professor Madoff, would you agree? Is it a $42 billion dollar 
subsidy – would you agree with Congressman Becerra? 
 
JOHN TYLER: Congressman Becerra says earmark – 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: Yes, sorry – earmark. 
 
RAY MADOFF: Well, I’m not going to agree with that because I sense from the crowd that 
that is not the thing to agree with! (Laughter)  
 
But I do agree that it is a subsidy, and although the issue is a complicated one, it is 
complicated on different grounds. It is not so complicated that it can’t be understood. And I 
would like to just take one minute to look at this.  
 
Some deductions are appropriate because they are a better reflection of income. So if you 
purchase something for $80 and sell it for $100 you are entitled to subtract that $80 from the 
$100 and that’s because that more accurately reflects your income. I’m not saying all 
deductions – every time the government doesn’t tax – is a subsidy. However, an insight of 
Stanley Surrey in the 1970s was that the government can spend money in different ways; 
sometimes it gives a direct handout, and sometimes it says, give us less. Some of those 
subsidies – like the one for your hybrid car – are in fact the same as if the government had 
sent you a check. The value of this tax expenditure analysis, the purpose of it, was to say that 
although they feel different to us, you should know they are the same, and therefore you 
should analyze them appropriately. It is a tool of greater insight.  
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This is where I take issue with some of the tone of sections of the monograph that talk about 
treating handouts differently than tax subsidies. If we give somebody a welfare handout, then 
they have to do all sorts of things. But if we just don’t tax them, then they don’t have to do 
things, then it’s just passive. The whole point of the tax expenditure analysis was to recognize 
that maybe these are the same; maybe they are not so different. To say that they feel different 
to people doesn’t really address the issue. 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: Someone prove to Professor Madoff that we actually have a 
diverse crowd here! We have Aaron (Dorfman), we have Pablo (Eisenberg)! Somebody ask a 
tough question, okay? 
 
(Laughter.) 
 
RALPH SMITH: Well, while you are getting it – it’s quite possible that what we want to do 
is to promote philanthropy; we want to promote generosity among those who have (wealth), 
and encourage them to put private wealth to a benevolent purpose. It feels to me that there is 
a deep societal and shared interest in that. It feels as if part of what we also want to do is to 
encourage and promote better decisions, good decisions by those folks.  
 
So on one hand government says that it wants to promote philanthropy and take into account 
the idiosyncrasies and the like, but there are certain things it is not going to allow charities 
and donors to do – like support terrorism, no matter how much they might like it; they draw a 
line and put some things on other side of the line. What I wonder is: Is there also a way, 
without compromising the decision, to do what the National Committee for Responsive 
Philanthropy (NCRP) is suggesting – lifting up some things so that they can be seen? NCRP 
is saying that x is “philanthropy at its best”; they’re not saying you have to do it. Is there a 
way to lift up some things so they get in the line of sight – people, and places, issues, and 
concerns that could be the natural beneficiaries of philanthropy? And if civil society isn’t 
quite doing that, is there a role for folks to do that? Would a glass-pockets, more transparent 
notion of philanthropy be a way of promoting better decision making on the part of folks? 
 
We need to be promoting good philanthropy, more philanthropy, and better philanthropy at 
the same time. It feels to me that this is what we are struggling with, and if we maybe had a 
ceasefire in the ideological war we might actually be able to make some progress on that! 
(Laugher) 
 
JOHN TYLER: Ralph (Smith), some of what we were hoping, and I think what Philanthropy 
Roundtable was hoping, with this monograph was to stir conversation and debate around the 
public money issue, which sometimes muddies and clouds a lot of the issues that you raised, 
Ray (Madoff) – and Glenn (Lammi), the issues that you raised in talking about AB 624 and 
the NCRP report. We were hoping that we could get enough clarity around that issue so that 
we would have an appropriate context for these other debates to happen – and they should 
happen. I don’t think any of us involved with the monograph would say that there shouldn’t 
be conversations around diversity. There should be the right context and the right sorts of 
consequences and thinking and approaches around that. These are good conversations; it’s 
important for the sector; and in fact it protects the plurality of the sector for those policy 
debates to happen in a policy context as opposed to a context that might be perceived to be 
more threatening.  
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WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: One could be forgiven for thinking, Ralph (Smith), after going to 
the meetings of the Council on Foundations, that legally this is public money. The rhetoric is 
so prevalent that one might assume that question had been long since settled. To be perfectly 
honest, when I heard that you all were writing this monograph, I thought, “Talk about 
swimming against the tide and dredging up arguments that haven’t been heard in seventy-five 
years!” 
 
JOHN TYLER: They actually haven’t been made very much. The topic is out there but the 
underside of it hasn’t really been exposed.  
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: Right, there were certain assumptions that have gone more or less 
unexamined for a very long time. 
 
RALPH SMITH: I just have to go to more Council sessions; that is all I can say! (Laughter) 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: I endorse that completely!  
 
RAY MADOFF: Can I just ask a quick question then about the style of the report?  
 
I do think that there would be a lot more agreement if the style was maybe different. A 
number of times throughout the report, How Public Is Private Philanthropy? you say that you 
are perfectly happy that there should be regulation drawing the line between private benefit 
and public charity, what constitutes charity, and what constitutes private benefit. My concern 
is that a lot of the reports that you reference complain that the folks who want more 
regulation or oversight want to “decide how many board members there are.” Those 
suggestions come in reports that are often very much focused on avoiding the private 
inurement problem by, for example, managing things like trustees’ fees and all that stuff. 
Don’t you think the report would have been stronger if you had said flat out, look, we think 
that a number of these proposals are appropriate because they really go to the nature of what 
it is to be charitable, and they go to the nature of private inurement? If you had carved out 
those things and then said, but we don’t think you should, and there are things that might be 
on the other side, that would be for me a more satisfying starting point so that we don’t have 
to go all the way back to stuff that shouldn’t really have to be argued right now, it strikes me. 
 
JOHN TYLER: The danger with doing the carve-outs, or doing the targeting thing, saying, 
we agree with these things and they are fine but these other things we don’t agree with, is that 
we then run the risk of getting into the dirt of the issues when what we wanted to do with this 
monograph is to not have the specific issues about number of directors, about trustees fees, 
about 5 percent versus 6 percent payout, about administering to have those things. 
 
RAY MADOFF: Those are very different things – number of directors and trustee fees are 
very, very different. One might go to management, and one goes possibly, to private 
inurement. 
 
JOHN TYLER: Sure, but getting into that conversation as a policy matter is a different 
conversation than getting into it in the context of public money or not.  
 
RAY MADOFF: Okay. 
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JOHN TYLER: And to get into it as a policy matter detracts from the public money argument 
in conversations that we want to have. So we would have rejected our own advice by setting 
things up in that sort of way. A colleague had suggested that we do something like that – 
presenting symptoms, if you will, as a medical diagnosis in a medical approach. What are the 
presenting symptoms here, and why don’t you lay those out and carve them out? Maybe 
that’s the next article. 
 
PABLO EISENBERG, Georgetown University: I commend the authors for writing the 
monograph and launching a discussion. What confused me was the lack of distinction made 
between legal arguments and political arguments in discussing what regulations are 
legitimate or not legitimate. John (Tyler), at one point in talking about how businesses and 
foundations should be similar, you mention the justification for Sarbanes-Oxley as leveling 
the playing field. Why shouldn’t that apply to foundations? The nonprofit sector is the one 
major sector that has no level playing field; it is governed by an elitist group of wealthy 
professionals and wealthy people. Why shouldn’t that be the criterion? Why is it okay to have 
a rule about payout when certainly it is an interference with the management of the 
foundation in terms of how much money they can give? And why is an antitrust provision not 
okay, in terms of Ralph’s (Smith) question, if it would prevent what is increasingly becoming 
a mega-foundation field dominated by two or three founding members and the possibility of 
harm to democracy five years from now? The theory might discern what the tension is 
between political and legal.  
 
But in a sense, who cares about the legal arguments and the points of origins? Most of the 
decisions are going to be political in future. 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: That’s actually a very interesting question, which is not surprising 
considering it’s from Pablo (Eisenberg)!  
 
(Laughter and agreement on the panel.) 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: On the basis of this monograph, can we now anticipate, for 
instance, a kind of a retreat from the argument that this is public money? Will this legal 
argument have some effect on the broader political notion of the public nature of this money? 
Is that your intention – and going to Pablo (Eisenberg)’s point, is there an entirely different 
set of arguments going on in the political sphere that this legal argument won’t touch at all? 
To put it harshly, what if you haven’t really gone after the dragon in its den? 
 
JOHN TYLER: There is a whole host of issues and arguments related to those issues in the 
political and policy sphere that this monograph doesn’t get to, won’t get to, and wasn’t 
intended to get to. To the extent that those issues in the political and policy sphere are shaped 
by the notion – an inconsistent ill defined notion – that it is public money, then that has an 
impact on the underlying debate.  
 
As far as the question about leveling the playing field, there is a very real difference between 
what the securities regulatory statutes and environment is as it relates to information – 
“leveling the playing field” as it relates to information – and “leveling the playing field” by 
distributing assets on some sort of a pro rata or equitable share or some other basis. The 
securities – and Sarbanes-Oxley among it – were intended to get to different things in 
leveling a completely different field. 
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JOHN EDIE, PriceWaterhouseCoopers: One quick comment before the point I want to make: 
In the twenty-three years I was with the Council on Foundations I don’t remember anybody 
in the Council on Foundations arguing that it was public money, so I’m not sure where that 
comment came from.  
 
The point I want to make is that I draw a huge distinction, a big line in the sand, between 
Congress saying that if you are going to get tax exemption and charitable deductions, you 
can’t commit certain abuses, and Congress saying that because you have the exemption and 
deductions, Congress can tell you how you spend your charitable money.  
 
In the sixties you had foundations that owned big organizations, big businesses, and were 
declaring no dividends; they were saying that they couldn’t give to charity because they 
didn’t have any money. Congress said, that’s an abuse, and we are going to regulate that. So 
you got payout and excess business holdings. Fast forward to top officials ripping off private 
benefits from the United Way of America; you got the intermediate sanction regulations. Two 
or three years ago, it was supporting organizations and donor advised funds that were being 
abused, and so you got regulations for that.  
 
It’s not because it’s public money. It’s because you’ve applied for an exemption, and if you 
get this exemption you can’t carry out abuses. To me that’s perfectly fine – and we’ll see 
more of those because unfortunately part of human nature is to abuse systems as much as you 
can. But as I said, I draw the line on the other side of it because it is a very different thing to 
say to an organization that is living perfectly within all the regulations, filing its returns, 
violating nothing, because you have these exemptions, public money, and within the 
charitable field, we are going to tell you how you spend your charitable money. That’s a very 
different thing, and I think talking about abuse regulation is really off the topic.  
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: Mr. Edie was general counsel with the Council on Foundations, 
and of course never in an official document was there the suggestion that this was public 
money! However, Ralph (Smith), you will recall that when Congressman Becerra made his 
comment about the earmark, I didn’t exactly see the foundations rising up in horror at that 
remark. That is what I meant by the general comment. 
 
JOHN TYLER: In one of our footnotes we cite a 1975 report by the Council on Foundations. 
The phrasing is slightly different, but they said that foundation assets are “not our money but 
charities.’” 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: Mr. Edie wasn’t there in 1975! 
 
RALPH SMITH: Let me ask John (Edie) a question. One would say that the asset allocation 
policy of a foundation really feels as if it ought to be a matter for private decision making. So 
let’s suppose, for example, we have a number of foundations that had asset allocation policies 
that put them in a very highly leveraged, cash-short position. Then the economy tanks, and 
foundations find themselves having to significantly reduce grantmaking to nonprofit 
organizations, who had no say in that decision and had no notice of the foundations’ asset 
allocation policies and the private decisions that were made. Given the Sarbanes-Oxley 
approach, given what we see on the private side with the SEC, do you think it would be fair 
and appropriate to require asset allocation decisions to be reported on a timelier basis, so that 
folks who depend on foundations would have the kind of information they need to determine 
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the extent of their risk should something happen in the market? And if so, would this be an 
appropriate thing for Congress or for states to require? 
 
JOHN EDIE: My first thought is that large private foundations file hundreds of pages listing 
every individual investment they have, so a lot of that information is ridiculously out there 
anyway, because nobody ever reads it, and it makes the return two thousand or three 
thousand pages long. I think that there are state laws that place obligations, with the Uniform 
Management of Institutional Funds Act and more recently the Uniform Prudent Management 
of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA). So there are state laws about fiduciary duties that can 
be enforced by attorneys general. If the question is, would it be beneficial for foundations or 
for that matter any charity with an endowment, university, museum or whatever, to be 
required to say, here is our asset allocation policy, and to make it public, several of them do 
voluntarily. I don’t see that as a big problem, particularly. I’m not sure that it would help the 
grantees in any way, shape or form, and my sense is that there are – 
 
RALPH SMITH: – Not if it’s two years after you do it! But suppose that it’s relatively 
simultaneous. Suppose that you really knew that your biggest funder was very highly 
leveraged and would not have the cash on hand to make the grant on which you are 
depending next quarter. What I’m doing, actually, is just saying I think you drew that line 
about abuse, and I’m wondering whether that is really the abuse/non-abuse. I’m wondering 
whether we are at a stage where this notion of stakeholders would invite us to think about a 
broader conversation that’s not just a dichotomy about whether there is an abuse or not, but 
where there are practices which ought to somehow be looked at because they might have 
some impact on the field and some impact on the extent to which the foundation or 
philanthropy could continue to maximize public benefit. 
 
JOHN EDIE: I guess my view on that is that pretty much everybody was hurt. I’m not aware 
of any foundations that were invested in the way you’ve described. Most foundations, most 
endowments, have lost money even though they could afford the most sophisticated and 
careful investment management information and advice that money can buy. In some 
circumstances they are down less than others, I think, because they did get good advice and 
they did hedge various things. So I’m not sure what that is going to gain.  
 
Would there be an odd situation where you would be able to look and see that a foundation 
has 90 percent in junk bonds, and that would that tip you off that maybe you shouldn’t rely 
on them? Yeah, probably. But I don’t see that. 
 
RALPH SMITH: Let me withdraw the question because I know Bill (Schambra) is looking at 
the clock and wanting to move along. 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: One last question if we could. And you all can respond to that as 
well, if you want to get into that. But in the meantime, Kevin (Laskowski) has a question, and 
it will be our last for today. Kevin? 
 
KEVIN LASKOWSKI, National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy: I would say to Mr. 
Edie that those who invested with Mr. Madoff were in exactly that position!  
 
This monograph – I say this after having read it very quickly – is obscuring the larger public 
policy questions of what foundations ought to be about doing with the relatively settled 
question, I believe, of the legal status of who owns the money, it seems to me. The argument 
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is less about the legal status and foundation autonomy than what obligations foundations have 
to the public and to the government, and which, if any, of those obligations should be 
enshrined as law.  
 
In light of that argument, I would really like to get to Ms. Madoff’s question – that is, are you 
satisfied with the current foundation situation? In the interests of promoting substantive 
accountability, are you satisfied with current foundation operations?  
 
WILLLIAM SCHAMBRA: A complementary question? 
 
ANNE HEALD, formerly with Washington Regional Association of Grantmakers, New 
Ventures in Philanthropy, and the German Marshall Fund: Ralph (Smith) has moved us into 
the direction of what is this larger industry, and what is government’s role in regulating this 
larger industry with respect to the larger public purpose? We depend on philanthropy to 
support nonprofits and deliver social services, advocacy, and many dimensions of civil 
society. No industry is very good at regulating itself. Are we asking the best questions about 
how we have the best – is there such a thing as malpractice in philanthropy? What amounts to 
really fulfilling the role in our society and what is government’s relationship to fulfilling that 
role?  
 
Just a quick example to Ralph’s question: In the private sector, companies in many places 
that do plant closings are required to give advance notification and worker adjustments 
strategies. For the film industry there is a censorship (ratings) board; it was under threat of 
Congressional regulation that the industry put a board in place that improved best practices. 
What’s the larger role, and are we accomplishing it in terms of our public policy? 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: That’s a terrific final question. In other words, beyond the legal 
argument here, what do we have to say about the broader public purposes of foundations? 
Are they in fact living up to certain public obligations? If not, what might be done? 
 
JOHN TYLER: I would answer both questions and both observations by suggesting that as a 
sector, foundations and charities can do better. I think that there are a lot of areas where there 
can and should be good conversations and debate about how to improve the sector and how to 
improve operations, how to improve effectiveness. I would also say that there is a danger in 
painting that with too broad a brush and applying one-size-fits-all best practice standards 
across the board to every organization in the sector. Does the sector need to continue its self-
assessment – and not just the assessment by itself of itself, but external assessments of the 
sector as well? I think that does need to continue, and is continuing. 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: Glenn (Lammi), I’m counting on you to say that the problem with 
the charitable sector is that there is way too much government supervision and we need to 
have less oversight. 
 
(Laughter.) 
 
GLENN LAMMI: What I did want to say though is that it depends what the measurements 
are as to whether or not a foundation is meeting people’s expectations. What are your 
expectations is the question, I guess. 
 
JOHN TYLER: Are those legitimate and are you legitimate in having those expectations? 
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GLENN LAMMI: A lot of that gets into subjective value choices as to what’s valuable and 
what’s not. I remember reading in the research for both the one-pager that the Washington 
Legal Foundation did on this, and for this, that there has been talk of this idea of creating 
somewhat of a variable tax rate in terms of rewarding certain kinds of philanthropy more than 
others. I think that gets into the distinctions of what’s more charitable than other things, and 
what’s more valuable in terms of the money that government is getting for its tax subsidy – 
and I hate to use that word because I don’t think of it as a subsidy! But I think if we get into 
those sort of subjective value judgments, we get into the risk that I tried to lay out in my talk, 
the questions of who is in charge, and who’s going to think what’s valuable and what’s not, 
and is that going to continually change? 
 
WILLIAM SCHAMBRA: If there are no further last comments, let’s thank our panel for a 
terrific conversation. 
 
(Applause) 
